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I. INTRODUCTION 
As experienced practitioners of the art of custody litigation are 
aware, the appointment of counsel for children in contested cus-
tody cases has an inconsistent and unsteady history. At best, the ap-
pointed counsel helped guide courts through the Scylla and Cha-
rybdis of parental advocacy with less pain for the innocent victims 
of that difficult trip-the children. At worst, appointment of coun-
sel for children has complicated the problem it was intended to 
solve. 
Attitudes towards appointment of counsel and the role the ap-
pointed counsel plays in custody cases are varied. Misunderstand-
ings abound, and lawyers and judges define the role in widely vary-
ing ways. A 1993 report by the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee of 
the Maryland State Bar Association Family Law Section noted that 
courts and attorneys alike face a "lack of clarity of the purpose for 
the appointment and the role of the attorney," when representing a 
child-client.! Further illustrating this lack of clarity are the results of 
a recent survey conducted by the Author of this Article, in which 
Maryland state circuit court judges offered a wide range of opinions 
as to what they believed to be the proper role of appointed 
counse1.2 
1. See Counsel for Kids Subcommittee of the Maryland State Bar Association 
Family Law Section, Court Appointed Lawyers for Children: Distinguishing the Roles 
and Responsibilities (1993) [hereinafter Maryland Bar Report] (a report for the 
bench and bar on file at the Maryland State Bar Association). 
2. As background for this analysis, the results of a survey of Maryland state cir-
cuit court judges on the use, effectiveness, and future of the role of appointed 
counsel for children are included. This empirical study is used to ascertain 
current attitudes regarding the use of appointed counsel and as a backdrop 
for comments about the potential role of appointed counsel in Maryland cus-
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Few lawyers have the skills necessary to fulfill the role of ap-
pointed counsel to children without outside assistance. This is be-
cause neither legal education nor continuing legal education pro-
grams currently equip lawyers with the skills or insight essential to 
make informed decisions in custody cases. 
Confusion over the role of appointed counsel must be elimi-
nated if the legitimacy of that role is ever to be tested. The relative 
success of the role of court-appointed counsel can only be mea-
sured by the ability to achieve its intended purpose. Until the pur-
pose of appointed counsel for children3 is commonly understood, a 
discussion of appointed counsel's "success" or "failure" is unproduc-
tive, if not misleading. For this reason, this Article advocates for the 
establishment of a clear definition of the role of appointed counsel 
for children. 
This Article sets forth a theoretical framework within which ap-
pointed counsel can make the difficult tactical decisions which must 
be confronted in each custody case. An analysis of this topic is im-
portant because appointed counsel is ideally situated to force the 
system to be sensitive to the long-term mental health of the child, 
both during and after a custody proceeding. 
II. MARYLAND LAW CONCERNING APPOINTED COUNSEL 
FOR CHILDREN 
A. The Power to Appoint 
In Nagle v. Hooks,4 decided in 1983, the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland made the appointment of counsel for a child mandatory if 
there was a disputed custody issue and a question was raised as to 
whether a child's statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege should be 
waived.s As defined in Nagle, the role of appointed counsel was con-
fined to making this single decision on behalf of a child: whether 
tody cases. Maryland state circuit court judges offered the following defini-
tions of appointed counsel: (1) a neutral fact finder; (2) an investigator who 
will submit a report to the court either with or without counsel's opinion; (3) 
a representative of the court; and (4) an advocate for the child. For a detailed 
analysis of the results of this survey, see infra Appendices A and B. 
3. Consistent with the legislature's intent that disabled adult children be placed 
on an equal footing with minor children, allowances for appointed counsel 
for minors are also applicable to disabled adult children. See Stem v. Stem, 58 
Md. App. 280, 298, 473 A.2d 56, 65 (1984). For the purposes of this Article, 
however, "child" will be used to mean "minor." 
4. 296 Md. 123, 460 A.2d 49 (1983). 
5. See id. at 129, 460 A.2d at 51-52. 
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the confidentiality of the child's communications with a treating 
psychiatrist should be waived so as to permit testimony by the 
mental health professional.6 The court held that when a minor is 
too young to personally exercise a privilege of non-disclosure, the 
court is obligated to appoint a guardian to act in the best interests 
of the child.7 
Moreover, the court held that the parents may not, jointly or 
severally, waive or refuse to waive the privilege on behalf of the 
child.s Basing its ruling on "the polestar rule of 'the best interests 
of the child,' "9 the court stated that a "neutral" third party was nec-
essary to eliminate the "very real possibility" that one or both par-
ents might use the waiver power for self-serving ends. to Subsequent 
courts have refused to extend the holding of this case and, thus, 
the purpose of a "Nagle v. Hooks appointment" remains limited to 
the decision to waive the child's psychiatrist-patient privilege. l1 
Except when judicially mandated by a need to address a child's 
testimonial privilege of confidentiality, the power to appoint counsel 
to represent children in contested custody proceedings is provided 
by section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland. Section 1-202 states in pertinent part: "In an action in 
which custody, visitation rights, or the amount of support of a mi-
nor child is contested, the court may: (1) appoint to represent the 
minor child counsel who may not represent any party to the action; 
and (2) impose against either or both parents counsel fees."12 Subti-
6. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995) (creating a statutory 
psychiatrist-patient privilege). Waiver of the privilege may not be necessary in 
cases in which a court-ordered investigation by the court's medical service 
leads to a written report subsequently admitted into evidence. See Newkirk v. 
Newkirk, 73 Md. App. 588, 596, 535 A.2d 947,951 (1988). 
7. See Nagle, 296 Md. at 128, 460 A.2d at 51 (" [T] he court must appoint a guard-
ian to act, guided by what is in the best interests of the child."). For a discus-
sion of the difficulties in determining the child's best interests, see infra Part 
V. 
8. See Nagle, 296 Md. at 128, 460 A.2d at 52. The court based its holding prima-
rily on section 9-109(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, which states that "'if a patient is incompetent to 
assert or waive this privilege, a guardian shall be appointed and shall act for 
the patient.'" Id. at 127, 406 A.2d at 51 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. 
PROC. § 9-109(c) (1995». The court found this statement to mean that ap-
pointment in such cases is mandatory. See id. at 127-28, 460 A.2d at 51. 
9. See id. at 128, 460 A.2d at 51. 
10. See id. 
11. See, e.g., Leary v. Leary, 97 Md. App. 26, 46, 627 A.2d 30, 3940 (1993). 
12. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991) (emphasis added). Section 1-202 does 
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tIe 8 Ouvenile Causes) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Arti-
cle of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides additional 
guidance: 
[I]n addition to any requirements relating to the appoint-
ment of counsel for children, at any time during the pen-
dency of any action where it appears to the court that the 
protection of the rights of a child requires independent 
representation, the court may, upon its own motion, or the 
motion of any party to the action, appoint an attorney to 
represent the interest of the child in that particular action. 
Such actions include but are not limited to those involving 
a child in need of assistance, child in need of supervision, 
delinquent child, or mentally handicapped child. \3 
As the language of both statutes makes clear, the appointment of 
counsel in a custody or custody-related proceeding is discretionary. 
It may occur either upon the court's own volition or by request of a 
party. 14 
Only one Maryland case has addressed the circumstances under 
which a failure to appoint counsel for a child might constitute re-
versible error. In Levitt v. Levitt,15 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland remanded a custody modification proceeding with a direc-
tion that counsel be appointed for the minor child pursuant to sec-
tion 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Ma-
ryland. 16 The court reasoned that if counsel had been appointed, 
not explicitly afford the trial court, in the absence of contested issues, the 
power to appoint permanent counsel for a child unless the parties consent. 
See Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 90 Md. App. 725, 734, 603 A.2d. 908, 912 (1992). 
Furthermore, this section does not authorize trial courts during divorce pro-
ceedings to appoint counsel to represent the interests of children with respect 
to other issues such as replevin, conversion, or the return of property. See id. 
13. MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-834(a)(l) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis ad-
ded). 
14. Only section 3-834 specifically allows counsel to be appointed upon motion by 
a party to the action. See id. 
15. 79 Md. App. 394, 556 A.2d 1162 (1989). 
16. See id. at 404, 556 A.2d at 1166. A master of the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Montgomery County recommended that the custody be changed from joint 
custody to sole custody with the father. See id. at 396, 556 A.2d at 1163. The 
chancellor disagreed and continued the joint custody. See id. at 397, 556 A.2d 
at 1163. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland vacated the judgment and 
remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 405, 556 A.2d at 1167. For further 
discussion of the role of master and chancellor, see Domingues v. Johnson, 
323 Md. 486, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991). 
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several deficiencies in the proceedings would have been curedY 
The deficiencies the court perceived were: (1) neither the Master, 
nor the Chancellor, spoke to the five-year-old boy; (2) no profes-
sional evaluation of the child had been done; (3) no one sought to 
admit testimony of a family counselor who had seen both the par-
ents and the minor child; and (4) no one suggested that a home or 
school visit be conducted by an unbiased professional. IS In Levitt, a 
contentious custody battle provided "a new arena for the parents to 
continue their on-going controversies."19 The court emphasized that 
in evaluating the child's best interests, the court should be "most 
concerned" with: (1) the effect on the child of the protracted, an-
tagonistic custody hearings; (2) the lack of input from the child or 
an objective witness during the proceedings; and (3) the lack of any 
advocacy on behalf of the child.20 The Levitt court remanded the 
case directing the trial court to appoint an attorney for the child in 
order to give the child a voice in the proceeding and to consider a 
professional evaluation of the child.21 
As precedent, Levitt may have no value beyond its unique facts. 
However, the court of special appeals implied that the trial court's 
failure to appoint counsel can taint the results of the court's deci-
sion under certain circumstances. 
B. The Role of Appointed Counsel 
Counsel appointed to represent a child faces an immediate di-
lemma: the appointed counsel must decide what role to assume in 
the pending custody proceeding. Absent specific direction from the 
court making the appointment, the appointed counsel's only source 
for guidance is section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland.22 This section calls upon appointed counsel 
simply to represent a child-client.23 In the few cases reaching the ap-
pellate level, Maryland's courts have not attempted to define the 
17. See Levitt, 79 Md. App. at 403, 556 A.2d at 1166. 
18. See id. 
19. Id. at 396, 556 A.2d at 1163. 
20. See id. at 404-05, 556 A.2d at 1167. "Neither the Master nor the Chancellor 
spoke to Chad. While not essential in every case, perceptive conversation with 
him should have shed some light on how Chad felt about his parents and 
grandparents." Id. at 403, 556 A.2d at 1166. 
21. See id. at 405, 556 A.2d at 1167. 
22. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991). 
23. See id. § 1-202(1). 
1997] Appointed Counsel 523 
role of court-appointed counsel,24 The courts instead have evaluated 
the appropriateness of the appointed counsel's decision on which 
role to assume in situations where the trial court provided no spe-
cific guidance or parameters.25 
In John O. v. Jane 0.,26 the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land considered whether appointed counsel properly represented a 
child-client where the trial court did not define the appointed 
counsel's role at the time of appointment.27 At trial, the appointed 
counsel took a position contrary to the stated preference of the 
child based upon counsel's own independent assessment of the evi-
dence.28 The appointed counsel sought to resolve the conflict by in-
forming the trial court of the child's own preferences.29 On appeal, 
the court of special appeals chose not to define what the appointed 
counsel should have done.30 Instead, the court held that, under the 
facts of this case, counsel's chosen form of representation was not 
inappropriate.31 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland later sanctioned an 
even narrower concept of "representation" in Leary v. Leary.32 In 
Leary, appointed counsel presented the children's desires without 
expressing counsel's own opinion on what was in the children's best 
interests.33 The appointed counsel did not comment on whether the 
children's statements of preference were sincerely motivated or ma-
ture.34 The appellate court characterized counsel's choice of role as 
"not . . . strictly . . . an advocate of their position, but . . . a con-
veyor of their preferences. "35 The Leary court explained that "the 
circumstances forced [appointed counsel] to take the middle 
ground between advocacy and fact finding. "3~ 
24. See, e.g., Levitt, 79 Md. App. at 404, 556 A.2d at 1166 (stating only that the "at-
torney should proceed expeditiously in the manner counsel deems to be in 
[the child's] best interest"). 
25. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text. 
26. 90 Md. App. 406, 601 A.2d 149 (1992). 
27. See id. at 435, 601 A.2d at 163. 
28. See id. at 435-36, 601 A.2d at 163-64. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. 97 Md. App. 26, 627 A.2d 30 (1993). 
33. See id. at 4849, 627 A.2d at 40-41. 
34. See id. at 4649, 627 A.2d at 39-41. 
35. [d. at 49, 627 A.2d at 41. 
36. [d. 
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In both John O. and Leary, appointed counsel decided that to 
represent the child meant interviewing the child to ascertain the 
child's point of view, and independently deciding whether the 
child's stated preferences were consistent with the child's best inter-
estsY The appointed counsel in Leary presented her client's prefer-
ences to the court without altering them to. include a contrary point 
of view.38 The appointed counsel in John 0., on the other hand, did 
not trust the child's motives and, given his perception of his role, 
decided to present the court with his personal point of view that 
was contrary to the child's stated preferences.39 The court of special 
appeals found neither approach to be inappropriate.40 
C. The Practical Dilemma 
Unless there is a strong showing that the role selected by the 
appointed counsel was detrimental to the child's best interests, it 
appears that the appellate courts in Maryland will not inquire fur-
ther. As intimated in cases such as Levitt and John 0.,41 the Maryland 
courts have commented quite favorably on the roles played by ap-
pointed counsel in Maryland custody cases. 
At present, a lawyer appointed to represent a child in a custody 
proceeding is forced to define his or her own role. The absence of 
standards, guidance, or direction leaves the appointed counsel in an 
extremely sensitive and vulnerable position. The passions of compet-
ing litigants leave little margin or tolerance for error. As long as the 
participants in the process are free to define the legitimacy or ap-
propriateness of the appointed counsel's role, counsel's actions on 
behalf of children in custody disputes are vulnerable to criticism 
and attack by disgruntled or dissatisfied parents or children, in con-
cert with lawyers who are happy to extend custody litigation into 
the post-trial arena. Motions to discharge or substitute appointed 
counsel, appeals, and even claims of malpractice, will be the ever-
increasing by-products of a system which leaves appointed counsel 
to make decisions without relying upon any authoritative guidance. 
These threats are likely to deter the appointed counsel's enthusiasm 
as well as the effectiveness of his or her advocacy. Such threats also 
add another layer of contentiousness to custody proceedings, al-
37. See id.; John 0., 90 Md. App. at 436, 601 A.2d at 163-64; see also supra notes 26-
36 and accompanying text. 
38. See Leary, 97 Md. App. at 49, 627 A.2d at 41. 
39. See John 0., 90 Md. App. at 435-36, 601 A.2d at 163-64. 
40. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
41. See supra notes 15-31 and acco~panying text. 
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ready overburdened with the conflicts triggered by the contesting 
parents. In this context, a discussion of the appointed counsel's 
"role" is not merely an academic exercise. It has practical implica-
tions which affect the potential contributions the appointed counsel 
can make to the system. 
III. SURVEY OF MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES 
Appointed counsels are currently deployed in a variety of roles 
in Maryland custody cases. In an effort to gauge judicial perceptions 
regarding the role of appointed counsel in custody cases,42 a survey 
was conducted of Maryland circuit court judges.43 
Although most judges indicated that appointed counsel should 
act as a "representative" of the child, a significant number of judges 
consider the roles of "a neutral fact-finder" and "a representative of 
the court" also to be appropriate. Further, many judges stated that 
they define the role of appointed counsel differently from case to 
case. The type of "representation" which judges believe appointed 
counsel should offer likewise varies. Moreover, judges' expectations 
regarding the independence of appointed counsel from the court, 
or from the parents, varies according to the nature of the case. 
Despite differences of opinions as to which role the appointed 
counsel should assume, almost all judges surveyed believe that the 
appointed counsel should routinely seek outside expert evaluations 
of the child. Many judges also responded that counsel should con-
tinue to have contact with the child for a period of time after the 
final settlement. This indicates that many judges see the role of ap-
pointed counsel for children as fundamentally different in nature 
from that of other legal representatives. Indeed, judges consistently 
acknowledged that children have different needs and capacities 
than adult clients. Appointed counsel must recognize these differ-
ences and adapt to them in every case. 
IV. DEFINING THE ROLE 
The court's authority to appoint a representative of the child's 
interest stems from the court's inherent power to serve as parens pa-
triatf'4 to mi~or children in custody proceedings. If the appointing 
court is not explicit about the nature and extent of the responsibili-
42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
43. For an abridged account of this survey see infra Appendices A and B. 
44. Traditionally, parens patriae refers "to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and 
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles.» See BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 
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ties it intends a child's advocate to undertake, the statutory authori-
zations for the appointment of counsel may restrict, rather than 
broaden, the court's inherent powers. 
The Counsel for Kids Subcommittee of the Family Law Section 
of the Maryland State Bar Association (Counsel for Kids Subcom-
mittee) has identified the roles "most widely required" in custody 
cases as: (1) Nagle v. Hooks waiver; (2) investigator; and (3) guardian 
ad litem.45 The single task contemplated for an appointee under a 
Nagle v. Hooks appointment is defined by case law.46 The role of an 
investigator is created by the court's exercise of its inherent power.47 
Therefore, the extent of the investigator's role needs to be defined 
by the appointing court.48 Counsel appointed to "represent" a child 
under section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland49 must undertake the tasks which the term repre-
sent connotes, unless a more task-specific directive is set out in the 
order of appointment.50 On its face, the directive to represent a 
child implies an involvement which is more extensive than the 
other roles. If a court deems it appropriate for appointed counsel 
to undertake a narrower role than the term represent connotes, the 
appellate cases indicate that it is incumbent upon the appointing 
court to so indicate in its initial order of appointment.51 An exami-
nation of each of these roles follows. 
A. Task Related Definitions 
1. Waiver 
A counsel appointed to determine whether a child's psychia-
trist-patient privilege should be waived is, by definition, confined to 
that narrow responsibility. This form of appointment requires only 
that counsel inform the court of a single decision. 52 It does not, on 
its face, require the appointed counsel to otherwise participate in 
the custody proceeding. Thus, the appointed counsel's opportunity 
or ability to influence the outcome of the legal process is limited to 
the impact of this singular decision. 
45. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1. 
46. See supra Part III. 
47. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 3. 
48. Cf. id. 
49. MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991). 
50. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 2 .. 
51. See, e.g., Nagle v. Hooks, 296 Md. 123, 460 A.2d 49 (1983). 
52. See supra Part ILA. 
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On closer inspection, however, the Nagle v. Hooks role is more 
complex than it first appears. Whether it is appropriate to waive the 
privilege and permit a child's therapist to testify in the proceedings 
depends upon what goals the appointed counsel is trying to accom-
plish. It is often difficult to determine the child's best interests. For 
example, if the child has been in therapy, and the disclosure of the 
therapist's thoughts and opinions in a court proceeding will jeop-
ardize the future therapeutic relationship, should counsel refuse to 
waive the child's psychotherapist-patient privilege? Counsel must 
balance the negative impact of possible loss of the future therapeu-
tic relationship against the possible negative impact of excluding in-
formation which may be relevant, or perhaps even crucial to the 
custody proceedings. If the appointed counsel in the Nagle v. Hooks 
role must take the child's best interests into account, the appointed 
counsel must determine where those interests lie. That is, counsel 
must undertake a complete factual inquiry to make an intelligent 
and informed decision. 
The Nagle v. Hooks role, however, does not presently contem-
plate any disclosure of the appointed counsel's thought processes to 
the court. There appears to be no judicial expectation that the ap-
pointed counsel will provide the court with a factual justification for 
a waiver decision rooted in the child's best interests. The only ex-
pectation is that a decision will be made and revealed to the court 
and to all of the participants in the custody dispute.53 
2. Fact Investigation 
Courts sometimes appoint counsel as an independent investiga-
tor.54 Typically, courts anticipate that counsel will conduct a factual 
investigation, including an inquiry into the child's preference. Such 
investigation occurs if the child's age is appropriate and the topic is 
relevant. Counsel must then submit "a report to the court.55 The 
court has the power to appoint someone to fulfill this limited role, 
53. In fact, the Nagle court may have done significant harm to the role of ap-
pointed counsel by defining appointed counsel as "neutral." See Nagle, 296 
Md. at 128, 460 A.2d at 51. A more apt definition would have been "not al-
igned with either named party," or "representative of the child's interests." 
The Nagle court intended for counsel to: (1) independently determine the 
child's best interests in the waiver of privilege issue; and (2) use these best in-
terests as the basis for decision of the waiver issue. See id. at 127-28, 460 A.2d 
at 51-52. 
54. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 3. 
55. See id. 
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and the role is often assumed by non-Iawyers.56 
Significantly, the obligation to report facts to the court en-
hances the opportunity to influence the outcome of the legal pro-
cess. Counsel appointed for this purpose does not represent the 
child.57 The appointed counsel's principal allegiance is to the court, 
whose need for neutral information generated and defined the ap-
pointment in the first place.58 Counsel appointed for this purpose is 
neutral, in contrast to the other self-interested parties in the custody 
litigation. The gathering and reporting of facts, however, is not a 
neutral process. The observations of the neutral fact-finder are 
filtered through his or her personal life history, experiences, biases, 
prejudices, and judgments. For this reason, the findings of a neutral 
fact-finder ought to be a subject of cross-examination by the other 
litigants, and an exploration into personal history and background 
should be as legitimate and permissible as with any other fact 
witness. 
B. Advocate 
Absent a narrower directive from the appointing court, counsel 
appointed under section 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the An-
notated Code of Maryland is called upon to represent a child.59 
Neither case law, nor the rules of professional conduct, offer more 
specific guidance to assist appointed counsel in deciding how to un-
dertake the tasks of representation. 
An advocate for a child can represent a child's interests more 
effectively than one whose role is limited by the court. An . advocate 
has the advantage of choice, for there are a variety of courses of ac-
tion from which counsel may select.60 The skill of counsel's fulfill-
ment of this role depends upon: (1) his or her being aware of all 
available choices; and (2) having a clearly-defined sense of 
purpose.61 . 
The most effective course of action may involve negotiating 
with all the parties involved, assuming a mediating role, counseling 
a misguided child, bringing outside influence or assistance to bear, 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-202 (1991); see also Maryland Bar Report, supra 
note 1, at 2. 
60. See generally Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
61. This is a standard by which he or she can predict, and later evaluate, whether 
a course of action will lead to the desired outcome. 
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or utilizing the full range of trial skills to advocate on behalf of a 
child in the courtroom.62 However, unless the role of the represen-
tative of the child is broad enough to include all of these responsi-
bilities, the representative's opportunity to be effective is signifi-
cantly limited. 
If the appointed counsel's role in representing a child is lim-
ited to fact-finding, whether by court directive or by the appointed 
counsel's own choice of role, counsel's ability to resolve the custody 
problem on behalf of a client is severely constrained. This narrow 
definition of "role" strips the appointed counsel of many tools that 
might otherwise positively affect the outcome of the litigation. For 
example, the appointed counsel cannot negotiate, attempt to bifur-
cate the custody proceeding and sever it from a contentious and 
time-consuming financial dispute, nor use his or her role as the 
child's attorney to influence a settlement. In short, this definition or 
concept of an attorney's role affords him or her access to only a 
very narrow and constricted scale of opportunity. 
The role of an advocate subsumes the narrower definitions of 
role outlined by the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee.63 An ap-
pointed counsel who effectively represents a child must not be con-
fined to the privilege issue, nor should the opportunity for advocacy 
be limited to fact investigation and neutral reporting to the court. 
The role of advocate must incorporate all of these and more. 
The Counsel for Kids Subcommittee uses the term "guardian 
ad litem"64 to describe a child's appointed representative under sec-
tion 1-202 of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Ma-
ryland.65 The term guardian ad litem, has historical roots which im-
ply a loyalty to the court greater than, or different than, the loyalty to 
the client.66 This is inconsistent with a lawyer's duty when he or she 
is called upon to represent a child's interests. The primary duty of 
loyalty of a representative of a child should be to the child, not to 
62. Cf Maryland Bar &part, supra note 1, at 2. 
63. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
64. See Maryland Bar &port, supra note 1. A "guardian ad litem" is a "special guard-
ian appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to repre-
sent an infant, ward or unborn person in that particular litigation." BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990). The use of that terminology is unfortu-
nate and is rejected by this Author. 
65. See Maryland Bar &part, supra note 1, at 2-3 (citing MD. CODE ANN .. FAM. LAw 
§ 1-202 (1991». 
66. See Ellen K. Solender, The Guardian Ad Litem: A Valuable Representative or an Il-
lusory Safeguard?, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 619 (1976). 
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the court. Thus, the term guardian ad litem creates confusion in an 
arena where the avoidance of confusion is the immediate objective. 
On the other hand, the use of the term "represent" is distinct 
and unambiguous. "Represent" typically describes the full range of 
actions which lawyers perform on behalf of their clients. Appointed 
counsel is not a passive overseer in the case, nor a representative of 
the court, regardless of the court's perception. When representing a 
child, counsel should maintain his or her status as an independent 
advocate. Although the lawyer may choose to posture himself or 
herself as a "neutral fact-finder" in any given case, that choice 
should be made only as a deliberate strategy designed to accom-
plish the purpose of his or her representation of the client. Ap-
pointed counsel must remember that fact-finding is but one phase 
of the appointed counsel's role as an advocate representing their 
client's interests. Further, appointed counsel should not report to 
the court, nor should appointed counsel become a witness who can 
later be subjected to cross-examination. 
Viewed from a broader plane, the purpose of the appointed 
counsel's representation of children is to bring about a solution to 
a custody problem which is consistent with the best interests of the 
child. This purpose is most likely to be achieved if appointed coun-
sel acts as an advocate, because only then can counsel's impact be 
felt at all stages of the custody proceeding. At each stage of the pro-
ceeding, the lawyer's task is to make the legal system respond cre-
atively and promptly to serve the best interests of the child. 
Appointed counsel's tasks are multi-faceted, and they require a 
knowledge beyond that which is typically developed in a traditional 
"legal" education. When assuming the role of appointed counsel, 
one must either grapple alone with unfamiliar mental health con-
cepts or collaborate with mental health professionals. Even such col-
laboration will not always provide all the answers. The theoretical 
constructs of the mental health professional provide the appointed 
counsel with some guidance, but there is no consistent theoretical 
framework to guide either the lawyer or the mental health profes-
sional through the murky area of child custody.67 Rather, appointed 
counsel must gather all of the information available, and then make 
informed, intelligent decisions. 
When handled properly, the role of appointed counsel can 
prove invaluable in a court proceeding. Certainly, the interests of 
67. See gmeraUy Diane Trombetta, Shared Parenting: Is it Working?, 27 FAM. & CON. 
CIUATION CTs. REv., Dec. 1989, at 17-20. 
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the child are integral to any divorce proceeding; they are, however, 
often ignored.68 Appointed counsel for children can help to fill this 
gap and offer children the protection that they deserve. 
V. ADVOCACY-DEFINING THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS 
To be effective, the appointed counsel for a child must under-
take the extremely difficult task of defining the "best interests" of 
the child, and take appropriate action to achieve this goal in a man-
ner which is the least detrimental to that interest. 
A. Theoretical Guidelines 
Divorce proceedings can have profound, lasting effects on chil-
dren.69 Therefore, every attempt ought to be devoted to minimizing 
these negative effects on children in custody proceedings. Two dis-
68. See Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394, 556 A.2d 1162 (1989) (holding that ap-
pointment of an attorney for the child of the parties was necessary because 
the child's interests were being ignored because the parents advocated only 
for their own interests). 
69. See 'Christopher F. Clulow, Divorce as Bereavement: Similarities and Differences, 28 
FAM. & CONCIUATION CTS. REv., June 1990, at 19-22. The Author argues that 
both divorce and death are major changes that introduce discontinuities in 
people's lives. See id. at 19. They both involve coming to terms with loss and 
the search for new meanings. See id. The long-term effects of divorce depend 
on how the breakdown of the marriage has been handled by the partners, by 
the children, if any, and by the community in discharging its legal and social 
responsibilities. See id. The bonds that hold people in marriage (e.g., eco-
nomic, legal, or emotional ties) tend to be easier to deal with when death oc-
curs than in the case of a divorce. See id. at 21. Likewise, the consequences for 
children of divorce are often more serious than when one parent dies. The 
two chief components of grief, sorrow and anger, are expressed differently ac-
cording to whether a marriage ends in death or divorce. See id. Moreover, so-
cial and religious rituals are supportive of the bereaved, whereas no such so-
cial and psychological provision is made for those whose marriages end in 
divorce. See id.; see also Richard Wolfman & Keith Taylor, Psychological Effects of 
Custody Disputes on Children, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L., Fall 1991, at 399417. Wolfman 
and Taylor report on a subset of data from an ongoing longitudinal study of 
95 children and their parents from 43 divorcing families, 27 of whom were in-
volved in child custody disputes, and 16 of whom had settled the issue out of 
court. See id. at 399. Contested children exhibited significantly greater inter-
nality of control orientation than the normative sample. See id. Contested chil-
dren's test scores also suggested significantly less separation anxiety and signif-
icantly more positive family concept than the uncontested group at post-test. 
See id. It is suggested that these unanticipated findings may indicate that cer-
tain aspects of custody litigation, its destructive potential notwithstanding, may 
actually contribute to children's development of adaptive coping strategies. See 
id. 
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tinct views have dominated the debate on what constitutes the "best 
interests" of the child in a divorce proceeding.70 Three noted child 
psychologists, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit, 
advanced the view that children are better off in the long run if 
one parent has complete control after the custody dispute,11 The 
dominance of this theory was eroded, however, when mental health 
professionals and courts began to question the efficacy of this solu-
tion.72 Numerous mental health professionals began to advocate the 
prevailing need for a strong, continuing relationship between the 
child and each parent,13 To date, neither side in this debate has 
gained universal acceptance,74 and indeed, individual circumstances 
may necessitate one approach over the other in any given case. 
Most importantly, a court appointed attorney must be familiar with 
each possibility to make an informed decision regarding a particular 
child-client's best interests. 
1. The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit View 
a. Summary 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit proposed that custody decisions 
should: (1) safeguard the child's need for continuity of relation-
ships; (2) reflect the child's, not the parents', sense of time; and (3) 
take into account the law's limited capacities to supervise interper-
sonal relationships or to make long range predictions.75 They recog-
nized, however, the difficulty that parents have in maintaining a 
constructive relationship with one another following a divorce.76 
Therefore, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit posited that custody should 
be awarded to the parent who, based on the above factors, repre-
70. See Deborah A. Luepnitz, A Comparison of Maternal, Paternal, and Joint Custody: 
Understanding the Varieties of Post-Divorce Family Life, 9 J. OF DIVORCE, Spring 
1986, at 1-12. 
71. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). 
72. See Joan B. Kelly, Longer-term Adjustment in Children of Divorce: Converging Find-
ings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL., Dec. 1988, at 119-40. But see 
Sheila J. Kuehl, Against Joint Custody: A Dissent to the General Bullmoose Theory, 27 
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REv., Dec. 1989, at 37-45; Leonard S. Jacobson & Al-
ice G. Dvoskin, Is Joint Custody in the Child's Best Interest?, 25 MD. BAR J., Nov./ 
Dec. 1992, at 11. 
73. See Michael Benjamin & Howard H. Irving, Shared Parenting: Critical Review of 
the Research Literature, 27 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv., Dec. 1989, at 21-22. 
74. See id. 
75. See GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 71, at 31-52. 
76. See id. 
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sents the least detrimental alternative.77 Moreover, the preferred 
pattern of custody and visitation should maximize the child's oppor-
tunity to maintain a continuing relationship with a primary "psycho-
logical" parent.18 Principal responsibility for nurturing the child's 
best interests should reside in the "psychological" parent.79 In addi-
tion, there should be minimal legal intervention once the initial 
custody determination has been made.80 
b. Controversies 
The approach of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit sparked several 
controversies. The first controversy centered on whether it is in the 
child's best interests to make custody decisions final, that is, not 
subject to continuous review or court involvement.8t Goldstein, 
Freud, and Solnit argued that making custody determinations final 
would safeguard the child's need for continuity and provide the 
child with the same rights to parental authority as are given to chil-
dren in two-parent families. 82 
The second controversy involved whether decisions regarding 
visitation should be under the exclusive control of the custodial par-
ents.83 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit contended that the courts' lim-
ited capacity to supervise interpersonal relationships, combined with 
the need to establish a stable source of authority, justified the con-
clusion that the custodial parent ought to exercise this function. 84 
77. See id. 
78. See id. at 19. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit define the psychological parent as 
"one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companion-
ship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a par-
ent, as well as the child's physical needs." Id. at 98. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 98-99. The California Supreme Court has followed Goldstein, Freud, 
and Sol nit in defining de facto parents: the court has held that although de 
facto parents may appear in proceedings involving child placement, they are 
not "parents" under applicable statutes; thus, they may not be awarded cus-
tody unless awarding custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child. 
See In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 254 (Cal. 1974) (en banc). 
81. See John Batt, Child Custody Disputes & the Beyond the Best Interest Paradigm: A 
Contemporary Assessment of the Goldstein/Freud/Solnit Position and the Group's 
Painter v. Bannister Jurisprudence, 16 NOVA L. REv. 621, 632 (1992); see also Ho-
MER H. ClARK, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 598-601 (1968). See generallyJo-
seph Goldstein, Anna Freud, 92 YALE L. J. 219 (1982). 
82. See Goldstein, supra note -h, at 38. 
83. See Batt, supra note 81, at 627-28. 
84. See Goldstein, supra note 71, at 38. 
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The remaining controversy pertained to the proper role of the 
child's legal representative. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit expressed 
concern about positioning legal counsel between parents and chil-
dren.85 They argued that once the court makes a determination, the 
role of the appointed counsel ends:86 
In designating a custodial parent, the court expresses 
the state's confidence that this particular adult has the 
greatest capacity among those available to fulfill the child's 
needs, including his need to be protected from and repre-
sented before the law. To do otherwise-to impose continu-
ing legal counsel for the child as a conditjon of a disposi-
tion-is to undermine that confidence and threaten, rather 
than promote, family integrity.87 
As Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit subsequently clarified, giving the 
custodial parent a primary role in determining visitation should be 
perceived not as a position opposed to visitation, but as the best way 
to maximize the benefits of the continuity of care, autonomy, and 
authority of the custodial parent in the child's long-term best 
in terests. 88 
2. Recent Research Findings 
There is significant disagreement on whether a child's concep-
tualization of a primary psychological parent, as implied in this ap-
proach, is determinative of the child's best interests.89 Indeed, subse-
quent research on children of divorce has demonstrated that the 
child's interests may be best served when: (1) contact is maintained 
with the non-custodial parent; (2) both parents cooperate in the 
parenting function; (3) parents have a continuing positive relation-
ship with one another; and (4) the child does not suffer from a 
feeling of abandonment at the decreasing interest and involvement 
of the non-custodial parent.90 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 30-52. 
88. See id. at 31-52. 
89. See, e.g., Loyola Association of Women Law Students, Symposium on Joint Cus-
tody: Seeking Solomon's Wisdom, 5-6 (1984) (arguing that, notwithstanding the 
theory of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, many child welfare professionals be-
lieve the child will adjust to post-divorce life more smoothly through signifi-
cant contact with both parents). 
90. See Kelly, supra note 72, at 119; see also Trombetta, supra note 67, at 18. 
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This research, coupled with an increasing emphasis on sexual 
equality, has led to a preference for various forms of shared paren-
tal responsibility.91 These alternatives to sole custody differ from one 
another in the degree of shared legal responsibility they vest in par-
ents, but they generally attempt to assure continuity of contact with 
both parents by decreasing the parent's perceptions that the cus-
tody dispute is a contest with a winner and a loser.92 
While this approach has merit in its sensitivity to a child's per-
ception of abandonment by a non-custodial parent, there are also 
negative factors to consider. For example, joint custody arrange-
ments are difficult to sustain because they demand a great deal of 
mutual respect on the part of the parents.93 However, shared paren-
tal decision-making creates an additional forum for their continued 
hostile entanglement.94 
3. Benedek and Benedek Theory 
Two prominent commentators, Elisa P. Benedek and Richard S. 
Benedek, have argued that no single custody solution is applicable 
to all situations, but rather, different circumstances call for different 
custody arrangements.95 Accordingly, they have proposed a set of 
factors to help determine whether joint custody is appropriate in a 
particular case: (1) the level of the parents' desire for joint custody; 
(2) the maturity of the parents; (3) the parents' commitment to the 
child's positive development; (4) the parents' predisposition to 
honor their agreement; (5) the proximity of the parents' residen-
cies; and (6) the child's desire for continuing contact with both par-
ents.96 These criteria address the motivations, attitudes, and inten-
tions of the parents.97 
91. See, e.g., Trombetta, supra note 67, at 18-19; see also Benjamin and Irving, supra 
note 73, at 21-33. 
92. See Richard B. PesikofI & Bette S. PesikofI, Child Custody in the 80's: The Effects 
of Divorce on Childhood and Teenagers and the Concept of Joint Custody, 23 F AM. & 
CONCIUATION CTS. REv., June 1985, at 53-55. 
93. See Kuehl, supra note 72, at 3745. 
94. See id. 
95. See Elisa P. Benedek & Richard S. Benedek, Joint Custody: Solution or Illusion?, 
136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1540, 1543 (1979). 
96. See id. 
97. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change 
in Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727 (1988) (noting that anecdotal 
evidence indicates that many women consider joint custody a "loss" of the cus-
tody battle, while many men view it as a victory; as a result, women often bar-
gain away property and support benefits in order to avoid the risk of losing 
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The Benedeks assume that the parents, regardless of the nature 
of the custody settlement, can determine whether or not continued 
contact with both of them will be a constructive reality.98 Where 
these factors imply that a joint custody arrangement is not feasible, 
continuing contact with both parents is not likely to be beneficial 
and may even be harmful to the child.99 
An alternative is to impose court ordered visitation when the 
non-custodial parent fails to remain involved. loo Court orders, how-
ever, are not a realistic solution because they rarely succeed in com-
pelling parents to have time for their child, or to continue to recog-
nize and honor their responsibilities. lOl 
The standard of the child's best interests is defined differently 
under the alternative, and sometimes conflicting, approaches of 
joint and sole custody. Furthermore, within each theoretical ap-
proach, numerous smaller distinctions present themselves. The 
child advocate's position, in each case, is likely to be consistent with 
some theoretical approaches and inconsistent with others. For in-
stance, a theoretician who attaches a greater value to the relation-
ship between two siblings might conclude that it is sufficiently im-
portant to both children that they should not be separated. I02 Given 
one child's age and the intensity of one child's stated preference, it 
might be equally legitimate to conclude that the children should be 
separated. There is no magic formula or authoritative theoretical 
guidance upon which counsel can invariably rely. 
Because of the ambiguity inherent in determining a child's best 
interests, many issues are left unresolved. Namely, who should de-
their children). 
98. See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 95, at 1543. 
99. See generally Trombetta, supra note 67, at 17-19. As Ms. Trombetta points out, 
research provides no clear answer as to how the effectiveness of shared 
parenting by divorced couples relates to sole physical custody of children. See 
id. at 18. What can be deduced from the research is that certain factors seem 
to enhance children's adjustment to divorce: (1) low levels of parental con-
flict; (2) the quality of the relationship with the noncustodial parent; (3) envi-
ronmental (especially economic) stability; and (4) the psychological well-being 
of the children's primary caretakers. See id. By looking at the full range of po-
litical, social, and economic implications of the recent trend in divorce laws 
toward shared parenting, it becomes clear that evaluating the success of joint 
parenting is extremely difficult. See id. at 18-19. 
100. See id. 
101. See Goldstein, supra note 71. 
102. See Stuart Fine, Children in Divorce, Custody and Access Situations: An Update, 28 J. 
CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPUNES, May 1987, at 361-64. 
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cide what is the most appropriate custody arrangement, and under 
what circumstances, if any, a child's advocate is entitled to disagree 
with a mental health professional's assessment of the child's best in-
terests. One circumstance in which it may be legitimate to do so is 
when the advocate possesses more facts than those relied upon by 
the mental health professiona1. 103 Such a situation is not uncom-
mon, partly because of the institutional constraints placed upon 
mental health professionals in their fact-gathering process, and 
partly because mental health professionals' approaches to "fact-
finding" and "reality" are different than that of a legally trained 
advocate. 
The incorporation of mental health theories by appointed 
counsel does not simplify the appointed counsel's task. Indeed, it 
often intensifies counsel's dilemma. It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to attempt to decide these complex issues for this discussion 
is intended only to introduce the reader to the conflicting theories 
on "best interests," and to emphasize the need for further educa-
tion, thought, and sensitivity. 
B. The Client s Preferences 
A lawyer called upon to represent a child has a client who is ei-
ther: (1) unable to express a preference about his or her future; (2) 
unwilling to express a preference about his or her future; (3) ex-
pressing an ill-advised or immature preference about his or her fu-
ture; or (4) expressing a mature and intelligent preference about 
his or her future. Accordingly, the appointed counsel must tailor 
his or her role based on the child's ability and capacity to make a 
choice about custody. Accomplishing this task is not easy. This, how-
ever, is a practical problem which must be addressed in every case if 
counsel intends to proceed with a clear sense of purpose. 
At present, there are no standards which give concrete gui-
dance. The comment to Rule 1.14 of the Maryland Rules of Profes-
103. See, e.g., Theresa Abrams, The Influence of Family Disruption on Clinician Bias in 
the Assessment of Children, 11 J. DIVORCE, Spring-Summer 1988, at 189-205. 
Abrams studied the correlation between the clinicians' life experiences such 
as clinician's biases, and whether they came from intact marriages, high-con-
flict marriages, or recently divorced marriages. See id. at 189. She concluded 
that the largest correlation was among clinicians who had themselves under-
gone marital disruption. These clinicians were more likely to find normal psy-
chological adjustment in the child, and were less likely to recommend further 
treatment for the child. See id. 
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sional Conduct addresses the problem, but does not present any 
real solution: 
The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the as-
sumption that the client, when properly advised and as-
sisted, is capable of making decisions about important mat-
ters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a mental 
disorder or disability, however, maintaining the ordinary cli-
ent-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. 
In particular, an incapacitated person may have no power 
to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client 
lacking legal competence often has the ability to under-
stand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about mat-
ters affecting the client's own well-being. Furthermore, to 
an increasing extent the law recognizes intermediate de-
grees of competence. For example, children as young as 
five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, 
are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight 
in legal proceedings concerning their custody. 104 
The American Bar Association Model Code of Professional 
Conduct offers equally convoluted guidance. Ethical Consideration 
7-11 states that: "[t]he responsibilities of a lawyer may vary accord-
ing to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a cli-
ent."I05 Ethical Consideration 7-12 provides that: 
[a]ny mental or physical condition of a client that renders 
him incapable of making a considered judgment on his 
own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer 
.... If a client under disability has no legal representative, 
his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make 
decisions on behalf of his client. 106 
Similarly, the Juvenile Justice Standards provide that counsel in a ju-
venile case should act as counsel would in any other case. I07 None 
of these pronouncements give the lawyer any relief from the need 
to struggle for a decision-making framework. In the line of fire, 
however, counsel must take a position, for neutrality has no place in 
advocacy. 
104. See MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.14 ernt. 
105. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-11 (1982). 
106. Id. at EC 7-12 (1982). 
107. See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, Counsel far Private Parties (1990). 
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The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (American 
Academy) has published Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Li-
tem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings. 108 It addresses the dilemma of 
client preference and offers a solution worthy of serious considera-
tion by any careful practitioner. These standards can be summarized 
into the following main points. First, if a minor is "unimpaired," 
then the advocate's role is identical to the role of an advocate rep-
resenting an unimpaired adult.109 If there is a rational and reasona-
ble basis for the client's choice, it is the responsibility of the attor-
ney to follow the client's instructions whether or not he or she 
believes it to be in the client's best interests. llo Second, if a client is 
"impaired," the role changes. Third, the decision of whether a cli-
ent is "impaired" or "unimpaired" is to be made by the lawyer, not' 
by the court.llt Fourth, when a client, by virtue of his or her impair-
ment, is unable to set the goals of representation, the lawyer shall 
not advocate a position with regard to the outcome of the proceed-
ing or issues contested during the litigation. ll2 Finally, there is a re-
buttable presumption that minors age twelve or older are 
unimpaired. ll3 
In contrast, the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee has taken a 
more flexible approach: 
At trial, a guardian may advocate a pOSItIOn that differs 
from the wishes of the child. Where the child is able to ex-
press a preference, it is essential that the guardian make 
the preference known or sees that the child has the oppor-
tunity to convey his or her thoughts directly to the Court. 
The guardian should be present at any time the child is ei-
ther testifYing or in chambers with the Judge. ll4 
If a child-client is not sufficiently mature to understand and ar-
ticulate his or her own desires, a question arises as to whether it is 
appropriate for appointed counsel to advocate any position on be-
108. See Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Cus-
tody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAws. 1 (Summer 1995) 
[hereinafter Standards]. 
109. See id. at 2.3. 
110. See id. at 2.4. 
111. See id. at 2.1. 
112. See id. at 2.7. The lawyer should not submit a trial memo or argue the case, 
although the lawyer should otherwise participate in the litigation. 
113. See Standards, supra note 108, at 2.2. 
114. See Maryland Bar Report, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
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half of the child. Under these circumstances, the American Acad-
emy would restrict counsel's role to fact investigation, counseling 
the client, negotiation, and generally monitoring, and influencing 
the course of conduct of the custody litigation. liS 
While it is true that lawyers are not trained by education or ex-
perience to make decisions about a child's best interests, lawyers are 
trained to gather facts, evaluate information, exercise judgment, 
and make decisions based on the information. With adequate train-
ing, the use of outside resources, and the acquisition of specialized 
knowledge, the appointed counsel can effectively advocate for the 
child's best interests. The American Academy's suggestion that the 
appointed counsel's role be restricted to something less than, or 
short of, courtroom advocacy is an unfortunate attempt at solving 
the problem. If a lawyer for a child is stripped of the power to advo-
cate a position on behalf of his or her client, the lawyer's derivative 
power to exercise any authoritative control over the course or out-
come of the custody litigation would be significantly limited. The 
appointed counsel's ability to obtain information, to negotiate solu-
tions of interim issues such as visitation and selection of schools, or 
to coerce contentious litigants into agreeing to a custody evaluation, 
are by-products of the appointed counsel's power to advocate a posi-
tion which may influence the outcome of the custody litigation. 
The appointed counsel's role in this situation, however, is that 
of an advocate, not of a witness. As an advocate, the appointed 
counsel's position is only as effective or as persuasive as the evi-
dence the appointed counsel can produce in support of his or her 
position. The appointed counsel does not, and should not, testify. 
Furthermore, it is improper and immaterial for the appointed coun-
sel to interject his or her personal opinion into the decision-making 
process. Courts are well-equipped to maintain the distinction be-
tween personal opinion and fact in the application of the tradi-
tional rules which regulate the introduction of evidence and the 
permissible scope of oral argument. 
One of the most troubling dilemmas for legally trained advo-
cates of children occurs when the advocate's personal beliefs about 
the child's best interests contradict the child's own preference. Un-
fortunately, this is a common problem in litigated custody disputes. 
Children develop and verbalize preferences for many reasons-both 
sound and unsound. At one end of the spectrum is the child who is 
mature enough to know his or her own needs and to express an in-
115. See, e.g., Standards, supra note 108. 
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telligent preference; at the other end of the spectrum is the child 
whose preference is the product of parental control. Parental con-
trol and influence in custody disputes may range in quality from 
gentle persuasion to insidious and destructive coercion. Such at-
tempts to influence children generally cause them to become un-
knowing surrogates for one side. This phenomenon is not confined 
to any particular age. The difficulty, therefore, arises when the child 
has expressed a preference, and the appointed counsel disagrees 
with the child. Is counsel then duty-bound to present the child's 
preference to the court and support the child's choice throughout 
the proceedings? 
Some would consider it an attorney's duty to advocate a client's 
preference in all situations. This "rule" certainly resolves the ap-
pointed counsel's ethical, and perhaps p.ersonal, dilemma. It is neat, 
clean, and unambiguous. If a child is to have a voice in charting his 
or her future, it should be his or her own voice. This appealing sen-
timent, however, is more beguiling than it is helpful. A child's 
stated preference is still the statement of a child. A child should be 
allowed to participate in the process and have his or her views con-
sidered. However, in light of the system's purpose in custody dis-
putes, including its concern about the family unit after a divorce, it 
seems unwise to unleash, within the dispute resolution mechanism, 
another force bent upon harm. To hamstring a child's advocate by 
requiring the active pursuit of an ill-motivated, misguided, or mis-
understood preference accomplishes little and carries within it a 
great potential for harm, not only to the child, but also to the par-
ents as well. 
Thus, if the role of appointed counsel is to achieve its full po-
tential, it is a mistake to impose rigid definitions or parameters 
upon that role. Rather, it is preferable to rely upon the appointed 
counsel's exercise of good judgment, subject to the scrutiny and 
controls inherent in the legal system and the rules of evidence. Ap-
pointed counsel must be given latitude in deciding how much 
weight is to be given a child's preference in any given case. It 
should not be the court's decision, nor should it result from a nar-
row definition of the appointed counsel's role. In that respect, the 
flexible approach of the Counsel for Kids Subcommittee is a wise 
solution. 
It should be permissible, although not mandatory, for the ap-
pointed counsel to advocate his or her view of the client's "best in-
terests" in cases where the client is too young, too immature, or is 
unwilling to express his or her view. Moreover, if a client has a pref-
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erence or point of view, the appointed counsel should never be 
bound by that point of view regardless of the age of the child. How-
ever, if the appointed counsel determines that the child's prefer-
ence is consistent with the child's best interests, the appointed 
counsel should act as an advocate to achieve that end. Finally, if the 
appointed counsel determines that the child's preference is incon-
sistent with the child's best interests, the appointed counsel must 
decide either to: (I) advocate for a result consistent with the cli-
ent's preference; (2) withdraw from the case; or (3) advocate for a 
result contrary to the client's preference. If the appointed counsel 
chooses to advocate a position contrary to the client's preferences, 
the appointed counsel must notify the client and the attorneys for 
both parents. If either parent objects, he or she may move for the 
removal of appointed coun.sel. 
Counsel's personal opinion about his client's best interests is 
not evidence, nor is it proper to interject it as evidence. In addi-
tion, counsel must make the client's position known to the court 
and, if the court will permit it, afford the client an opportunity to 
be heard throughout the course of the proceeding. 
VI. PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR DECISION-MAKING 
A. The Search for the Least Destructive Choice 
Once the appointed counsel understands the parameters of his 
or her role and the goals to be attained, dilemmas emerge. As both 
practitioners and the public are aware, "advocacy" can encompass 
behavior ranging from the compassionate to the cruel. If the ap-
pointed counsel is to be effective, his or her decisions and conduct 
must be strategically guided by the goal he or she seeks to accom-
plish for the child-client. Given the passions and prejudices which 
accompany custody litigation, the appointed counsel is in a unique 
position to affect not only the decision of the judge, but also the fu-
ture attitudes of the parents and children toward each other and 
the legal system. 
The purpose of this discussion is to suggest a practical frame-
work to help guide the appointed counsel through the decision-
making process. This framework is premised upon the notion that 
there are seldom any correct answers to give the appointed counsel 
the steadfast and guilt-free reassurance he or she strongly desires. 
Instead, the appointed counsel is forced to first ask the right ques-
tions. Having done so, the appointed counsel must then examine 
the consequences of his or her responses. Through this repetitive 
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process, the appointed counsel can hopefully acquire the wisdom to 
select the least detrimental alternative available to achieve his or 
her purpose. 
Every decision appointed counsel makes, from whether to first 
interview a child or the child's parents, to which questions to ask, 
has consequences. If, in advocating a child's interests, the appointed 
counsel's purpose is to achieve the desired outcome in a way which 
is least detrimental to those interests, then the appointed counsel 
must evaluate the choices not only in terms of their consequences 
upon the outcome of the case, but also in terms of their impact 
upon relationships in the family after the case is resolved. A con-
cept of representation or advocacy which takes into consideration 
the impact of strategic decisions, both in terms of the legal out-
come and their impact on future family relations, forces an advo-
cate to consider alternative strategies which may achieve the desired 
results at a lower cost to future family relationships. 
A litigator's sense of tactics and legal procedure, although es-
sential, is an incomplete tool for this difficult task. For example, if 
the interests of the child would be best served by the custodial care 
of the mother, and counsel has become aware that the father is in-
volved in a homosexual liaison, should the appointed counsel dis-
close this fact to the court or to the other parent in order to attain 
the desired objective? If disclosure is likely to adversely affect the re-
lationship between the parents in the future, should the appointed 
counsel look for a less destructive way of advocating custody for the 
mother, such as encouraging settlement negotiations in the relative 
privacy of a chamber's conference, or threatening disclosure in ne-
gotiating with the father or the father's attorney? 
Of course, the ultimate inquiry is whether disclosure of the liai-
son is needed to persuade a judge to grant custody to the mother. 
If the answer to this question is yes and settlement is not possible, 
then the appointed counsel is left with no alternative except to 
make the disclosure. In such a case disclosure may be the least det-
rimental alternative available to accomplish the appointed counsel's 
goal for the child, and cross examination of the father on this sensi-
tive issue may be necessary despite its potentially adverse effect on 
future familial relationships. 
Adversarial zeal should, at times, be curtailed because of a 
stronger necessity to safeguard and promote the child's long-term 
relationships with both parents. Thus, the notion of advocacy 
should include safeguards that prioritize the preservation of paren-
tal access unless, and until, a contrary course of action becomes 
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necessary. The notion of advocacy must be broad enough to re-
spond not only to the issue of legal custody, but also to the child's 
total life situation. Although the earlier discussion in this Article ad-
dressed the weight to be given to the child's stated preference, 116 
apparently most children prefer to be raised by both parents and 
their selection of one parent over the other may be more an artifice 
of the divorce context than a statement of greater psychological at-
tachment. ll7 Therefore, the child's advocate should take precautions 
to ensure that the child's preference is not used in a way which may 
jeopardize the continued relationship with the parent who is not 
awarded custody. 
Appointed counsel in this hypothetical has several strategies 
available to deal with this "ethical" dilemma: (1) negotiate with 
both parents for a compromise solution; (2) try to persuade the cli-
ent to change his or her mind; (3) inform the court of the client's 
preference and advocate against it, as did counsel in John 0.;"8 (4) 
advocate for the client's stated preference; (5) try to persuade a 
parent to drop the custody dispute; or (6) withdraw as counsel. To 
add to the complexity of this situation, assume that the appointed 
counsel is the only person who knows of the client's preference. 
No single answer fits all situations. Nevertheless, the most im-
portant lesson to be learned from the foregoing discussion is that it 
is in the client's best interests to use the information obtained in a 
fashion that is least detrimental to continuing relationships in his or 
her family, and strategically appropriate to accomplish the purposes 
the appointed counsel has defined for his client in the custody 
determination. 
If the appointed counsel's purpose is, for example, to have the 
daughter reside with her father while maintaining her relationship 
with her mother and receive counseling, the appointed counsel may 
decide to say nothing to either parent about the daughter's prefer-
ence. The appointed counsel should attempt to allow her to speak 
to the judge without a court reporter present, and ask the judge to 
render an opinion which does not disclose the child's preference to 
either parent."9 
116. See supra Part V.B. 
117. See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 95, at 154043. 
118. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
119. This approach requires a waiver from all parties because a judge's interview of 
a child must be recorded by a court reporter and the record must be made 
available to all parties, unless waived. See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 54 Md. App. 474, 
480,458 A.2d 1257 (1983). 
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B. Some Guiding Principles 
1. The Appointed Counsel Should Actively Participate with Attor-
neys for the Parents 
The appointed counsel should actively participate in the deci-
sion-making process to minimize the adverse effects of destructive 
strategies employed by the parents or their lawyers. Counsel should 
develop a working relationship with both parents, the lawyers, his or 
her client, and anyone else having a significant role in the case. All 
participants should understand that their objections to anyone's 
conduct should be brought to the attention of the child's attorney. 
Parents should understand, for example, that psychological exams 
should not be conducted without the appointed counsel's knowl-
edge. The purpose of imposing this edict is to prevent lawyers or 
parents from expert-shopping, which often over-involves the child, 
forces an unwanted "co-conspirator" role on a child who has natu-
ral loyalties to both parents, prolongs the litigation, and escalates 
parental hostilities toward one another and the legal system. If the 
appointed counsel becomes aware that either parents or their law-
yers are using dilatory strategies, the appointed counsel should ac-
tively intervene to advise against such strategies. 
2. The Appointed Counsel Should Take Advantage of his or her 
Unique Position to Mfect the Way Custody Litigation is 
Conducted 
The appointed counsel for the child is in a uniquely powerful 
position to affect not only the outcome of custody litigation, but the 
manner in which the confrontation is waged. The manner in which 
the legal system decides a custody case can be as important as the 
ultimate decision it makes. 120 Parental attitudes toward the process 
will affect their willingness to accept and abide by any decision 
made. Their willingness to accept the court's decisions can be criti-
cal to the child's future well-being within the divorced family. 
For instance, if a custody assessment is needed, and the par-
ents' lawyers, by design or incompetence, have done nothing to ini-
tiate the process, the appointed counsel should actively intervene 
and insist that custody be done by consent or, if unable to force 
this mutual concession, file a motion on the child's behalf request-
ing this relief. 121 
120. See generally Wolfman & Taylor, supra note 69, at 399415. 
121. If the request for a custody assessment is refused by any party, a motion can 
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If parents in a custody case become enmeshed in their own 
power struggle, the child's attorney should place himself or herself 
directly between the parents and his client. If the parents cannot 
agree on the style of haircut, the choice of pediatrician, or the cor-
rect extracurricular activities in which their child should participate, 
then the appointed counsel must actively intervene. Otherwise, the 
child's frequent haircuts, visits to different doctors' offices and mul-
tiple lessons, games? camps, and church meetings could create an 
overly enmeshed, overly indulgent, petulant monster who is a victim 
of the lack of insight of the parents and appointed counsel. If it re-
quires the filing of a motion, efforts to work with the parents' law-
yers, or the appointment of a monitor mental health professional, 
the appointed counsel should intervene to make it happen. 
This active involvement is required at all stages. If a parent 
wants the last opportunity to persuade the child by being the parent 
who delivers the child to chambers for an interview, then the ap-
pointed counsel should prevent this from happening. The ap-
pointed counsel should deliver the child or ensure that a neutral 
party discharges this task. 
At trial, the appointed counsel's role is to present witnesses, 
control the agenda, examine, and cross-examine to advocate for the 
client. It is an instrumental role.122 
VII. CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATING APPOINTED COUNSEL IS 
APPROPRIATE 
This Article advocates an appointed counsel role that requires a 
court to consider more than the substantive issues in a custody case 
when deciding whether to appoint counsel for the child. The court 
should consider the manner in which the custody dispute is likely 
to be resolved if counsel is not appointed. For instance, a parent or 
lawyer may be using child custody as a weapon in an acrimonious 
divorce. Appointed counsel may be in a unique position to inform 
the court and control such activity, which may not be apparent 
when the custody issue is uncomplicated. In such circumstances, the 
appointed counsel may protect the child from the destructive ac-
tions of parents or their lawyers, even if the appointed counsel does 
not add a shred of advocacy or information to the case. Under such 
circumstances, the appointed counsel's efforts to control the process 
be filed to proceed with the assessment. See MD. RULE 2-423. 
122. This Author has, on occasion, assumed the lead and presented the child's 
case first. 
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may be more of a long-term benefit to the child than the court's ul-
timate custody decision. 
The courts' view of the appointed counsel as an active inter-
venor" in the custody decision process would make such appoint-
ment suitable to many child-custody divorce cases. For example, ap-
pointed counsel may be appropriate in a case where a high level of 
conflict or power struggle between parents exists. Such a case may 
be indicated by: (1) a high number of pleadings; (2) the presence 
of lawyers reputed to attract conflict-seeking parents; (3) the pres-
ence of sexual issues, including but not limited to abuse; and (4) 
the fact that one or both parents are pro se or have discharged nu-
merous attorneys. 
Another situation where appointed counsel may be appropriate 
is where a case indicates a high level of conflict or power struggles 
between lawyers. Some indicia of such conflict are: (1) the reputa-
tion of the lawyers; (2) the number and content of contested mo-
tions and hearings; and (3) the number of requests for delays and 
postponements. 
The court's potential receipt of inadequate 'or incomplete infor-
mation about a child is also pertinent to appointed-counsel's deci-
sion. Such potential may be evidenced by: (1) the apparent incom-
petence of lawyers; (2) the parents' refusal to disclose medical 
histories; and (3) a child age ten or older expressing a desire to re-
side with one parent where the other parent opposes such a custody 
arrangement. 
These are just a few of the many circumstances that may make 
the appointment of counsel appropriate under the model advocated 
by this Article. The examples illustrate how the legal system's view 
of appointed counsel's validity and utility can change when the ap-
pointed counsel's role is more clearly defined. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Author can attest from experience to both the enormous 
complexity and vast potential of appointed counsel's role in divorce 
and custody litigation. If the appointed counsel actively intervenes 
to prevent the destructive use of the legal system or the child dur-
ing custody litigation, the resulting benefit would often justify the 
cost, even if the appointed counsel never appears at the trial table 
or advocates a position. Such benefit, of course, assumes the ap-
pointed counsel's ability to recognize or predict parental behaviors 
which negatively affect the legal and family systems. 
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The role of appointed counsel defined in this Article is a pow-
erful one. The appointed counsel is in a unique position to gather 
evidence, influence the course of litigation, and affect its end result. 
In the right hands, this power can be a potent adjunct to the effi-
cient resolution of custody disputes. In the wrong hands, such 
power has the potential· for hann. The following recommendations 
help ensure that families derive the important benefits of appointed 
counsel and do not become unwilling or unwitting recipients of its 
potential negative consequences. 
A. Early Warning System 
Custody litigation must be evaluated by the legal system early in 
the case. If the dispute meets criteria such as those listed in the pre-
vious section, then the system itself must initiate the involvement of 
competent appointed counsel. If counsel intervenes early in the 
process, the chances are better, though not guaranteed, that the po-
tentially destructive aspects of the litigation can be minimized. 
B. Implementation of Standards of Appointed Counsel 
Courts should require that counsel appointed to represent chil-
dren meet prescribed levels of competence based on training in the 
field, years of experience, exposure to family law issues, and reputa-
tion in the community. Inexperienced lawyers will not provide the 
level of competence needed to perform this role adequately. A 
mere interest in custody litigation is helpful, but insufficient to qual-
ify the attorney. The role demands a range and level of knowledge 
and skill, including trial advocacy, which is highly valued even in ex-
perienced practitioners. 
Whether established by local or state bar associations, or judi-
cial rulemaking, criteria must be established to insure that the role 
of appointed counsel be vested in capable hands. Such criteria 
should include: (1) participation in a court or bar association ap-
proved training program addressing effective performance in the 
appointed counsel role; (2) specified number of years of practice; 
(3) specified experience in family law and custody matters, includ-
ing litigation, negotiation, and mediation; (4) general reputation 
for competence in the legal community; and (5) expressed interest 
and aptitude. 
C. Certification for Counsel 
Appointed counsel should not be certified to represent chil-
dren in custody cases prior to completion of an interdisciplinary le-
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gal and mental health training program. The curriculum should in-
clude the following broad topics: (1) defining the role-what it 
means to represent a child; (2) the best interests of a child-an in-
depth theoretical overview of expert opinion and its empirical base; 
and (3) investigation and evaluation of a custody case-the dissimi-
lar approaches of legal and mental health professionals. 
The certification should also address practical dilemmas, in-
cluding: (1) how to interview children; (2) how to relate to the par-
ents in a custody and divorce situation; (3) how to evaluate the 
child's expressed preference; and (4) how to prepare for an in-
chambers interview. The program should offer alternatives to pro-
tracted litigation, including mediation, arbitration, and post-divorce 
monitoring. Finally, the curriculum should include instruction on 
potential ethical dilemmas, including disagreements with the child-
client, disagreements with the expert, and problems in appointed 
counsel's relationship with the court. 
D. Adequate Compensation for Counsel 
If counsel is not compensated adequately,123 the level of compe-
tence will be adversely affected. The corresponding lack of consis-
tency, dedication, and skill in the role will preclude the court and 
children from receiving many important benefits that appointed 
counsel can provide. 
To overcome this problem, courts should require parents to 
pay retainers and to pay for appointed counsel services on a regular 
basis. In the alternative, courts should insist that payment be guar-
anteed from the sale or other disposition of marital assets. 124 
Contrary to popular belief, if the appointed counsel undertakes 
the task of representation with the viewpoint advocated in this Arti-
cle, such participation will often reduce the cost of custody litiga-
tion. For example, the appointed counsel may perform functions 
otherwise handled by parents' attorneys, such as interviewing wit-
nesses and selecting experts. Appointed counsel may also help re-
solve recurring and expensive visitation issues before they result in 
prolonged and expensive contested court proceedings. Very often, 
123. Currently, courts have not set any standards for the compensation of ap-
pointed counsel. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, however, has 
held that appointed counsel for a child is entitled to compensation from the 
parents. See Lapides v. Lapides, 50 Md. App. 248, 254, 437 A.2d 251, 254-55 
(1981). 
124. Alternatively, the state could create a fund for appointed counsel as New York 
has established. See N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 35, 243, 245, 249 (McKinney Supp. 1997). 
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participation by appointed counsel will bring litigation to a negoti-
ated conclusion far more rapidly than if the process is left to the 
contending parties, namely the mother, father, and their lawyers. 
The survey of Maryland circuit court judges indicates that the 
judiciary is well aware of appointed counsel's current shortcomings, 
but nonetheless remain strongly in favor of its increased use. IT the 
recommendations in this Article are followed, appointed counsel for 
children in custody proceedings can begin to achieve his or her po-
tential. Children, at last, will be afforded the voice they have been 
so long due. 
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY OF MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES 
In an effort to gauge judicial perceptions regarding the role of 
appointed counsel in custody cases, a survey. was conducted of cir-
cuit court judges throughout the state of Maryland. 
I. RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS 
The present role of appointed counsel in court varies widely, 
even within the same judge's courtroom. The role of appointed 
counsel was defined as follows: representative of child (43/45, 
96%); neutral fact-finder (26/45, 58%); representative of the court 
(18/45, 40%); and other (3/45, 7%). Most judges accept variations 
of the role of counsel (32/45, 71 %), while a relatively few see only a 
single acceptable role (13/45, 29%). Only 11 out of 45 judges indi-
cate they use appointed counsel strictly as an advocate for the child. 
The judges surveyed also stated that appointed counsel should 
advocate on behalf of their client as follows: by making a child's 
wishes clear, but advocating for the child's best interests (39/45, 
87%); or by advocating the child's best interests, even if they con-
flict with child's stated wishes (23/45,51%);, or some combination 
of these two approaches. 
Few judges believe that appointed counsel should be an advo-
cate for the child's wishes, regardless of the attorney's views on the 
child's best interests (9/45, 20%). Indeed, several judges view this 
option as entirely inappropriate (5/45, 11%). 
Most judges believe that advocacy must be contoured to the 
needs of each case, and that to cast a definition of the appointed 
counsel's role in stone, is inappropriate and unworkable. 
Most judges believe that appointed counsel should rely some-
what on psychiatric or other independent evaluations (38/45, 84%). 
A minority of judges would have appointed counsel place great reli-
ance upon independent evaluations by mental health professionals 
(8/45, 18%). Two judges expressed a belief that counsel should rely 
on such evaluations "very little" (2/45,4%), and one judge believed 
that counsel should ignore these evaluations altogether (1/45, 2%). 
Relatively few judges believe that reliance on mental health profes-
sionals should vary from case to case (6/45, 13%). 
Many judges believe that the amount of contact appointed 
counsel should have with the parents' attorneys should vary accord-
ing to the needs of the case (22/46, 48%). The judges did not over-
whelmingly subscribe to any single response on this issue. . 
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Virtually all judges believed that ex parte communications be-
tween the court and appointed counsel are improper (43/46, 93%), 
although many will allow such communications under exceptional 
circumstances (21/46, 46%). Several judges, however, do allow ex 
parte communications between appointed counsel and the court (3/ 
46,7%). 
II. EVALUATION OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 
A. Summary 
The responding judges overwhelmingly concluded that an ap-
pointed counsel has a beneficial effect in divorce and custody pro-
ceedings. Moreover, most of the judges considered an appointed 
counsel's work to be either excellent or good. This is not surprising, 
given- the selectiveness judges appear to employ in appointing 
counsel. 
Nonetheless, judges found several faults with the current use of 
appointed counsel. Most judges cited lack of definition of the role, 
as well as a lack of experience and lack of relevant outside knowl-
edge, . as the primary weaknesses facing counsel appointed to repre-
sent children. 
Finally, the judges made many suggestions concerning the im-
provement of the role, which are addressed in the text of this 
Article. 
B. Results of Individual QJlestions 
Most of the judges believed that the termination of the ap-
pointed counsel's role in the case, and the termination of the ap-
pointed counsel's relationship with a client, should vary in each 
case (33/44, 75%). No judges indicated specifically that appointed 
counsel should terminate his or her relationship before settlement. 
Several judges indicated that counsel should terminate the relation-
ship after settlement occurs. 
Most judges found the quality of representation presently af-
forded by appointed counsel either excellent (23/46, 50%) or good 
(20/46, 43%). Of these, most found the work either uniformly ex-
cellent (20/46, 43%) or uniformly good (17/46, 37%). A few had 
mixed experiences and gave mixed reviews. A minority of judges 
find the work adequate (5/46, 11 % ), and almost none found the 
quality of the work poor' (1/46, 2 %) . 
The majority of judges found that appointed counsel affect pro-
ceedings "beneficially" (39/46, 85%). None found the effect of ap-
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pointed counsel to be detrimental. Once again, some of the judges 
found the effect to vary (8/46, 17%). 
A majority (23/43, 56%) of the judges surveyed believed that 
one of the "greatest weaknesses" of appointed counsel for children 
today was the lack of definition of the appointed counsel's role. 
Other often-cited weaknesses included: inexperience as ap-
pointed counsel for children (13/43, 30%) and lack of outside 
knowledge that would be beneficial to counsel (e.g., psychiatric 
knowledge) (10/43, 23%). One judge responded that inexperience 
in the practice of law was one of the "greatest weaknesses." None of. 
the judges found a lack of legal skills a great weakness. 
Finally, some judges listed no weaknesses in the counsel they 
had appointed (5/44, 11%). Four of these five judges also re-
sponded that they only appoint counsel with whom they are person-
ally familiar. 
C. Summary of Judges' Recommendations 
The recommendations made by the judges can be summarized as 
follows: (1) clarify the role of appointed counsel; (2) distinguish 
them from other experts; (3) encourage the appointed counsel to 
communicate freely with counsel for the other parties; (4) teach the 
appointed counsel to represent a child's best interests; (5) a court 
order should spell out appointed counsel's role explicitly; (6) create 
a training program for appointed counsel; (7) family law section of 
the state/local bar should establish minimum requirements (and 
perhaps court certification) that require appointed attorneys to 
have practiced family law for five years and to have participated in a 
minimum of 20 domestic relations cases; (8) create a list of counsel 
available for appointment, including information on specific attrib-
utes such as experience, interests, and talents; (9) set guidelines for 
the compensation of appointed counsel; (10) create a fee schedule 
using factors such as the complexity of case and parents' ability to 
pay; (11) make other support resources available to appointed 
counsel, such as psychologists and psychiatrists; (12) train judges on 
the use of appointed counsel; (13) counsel parents on the effect of 
divorce and custody litigation on children to encourage amicable 
settlement; (14) recognize the need for appointed counsel early; 
and (15) inform appointed counsel of the case's real issues early 
on. 
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III. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
A. Sample Size and Composition 
One hundred and twenty Maryland circuit court judges re-
ceived our survey. The author received the following responses: 46 
completed questionnaires, 1 textual response, and 3 "not sufficient 
experience to answer." The data reported below represents a total 
of 50 respondents,l25 or 42% of 120 Maryland circuit court judges. 
While most judges returned the survey anonymously, we re-
ceived enough signed surveys, or surveys attributed to a certain 
county, to know that the sample is representative of the entire state 
and is not geographically biased. 
B. Presentation oj Data 
The tables in Appendix B indicate the individual responses of 
every responding judge. Judges often selected more than one re-
sponse to a question. Thus, the total aggregate number of responses 
often exceeds the number of responding judges. 
The two primary methods of reading the data are (1) 'measur-
ing trends in the overall responses to determine how judges gener-
ally respond to a given question; and (2) examining trends in indi-
vidual responses to determine specifically how judges will answer a 
given question. 
IV. SURVEY RESULTS 
For an abridged version of the survey results, see Appendix 
B.126 The following is a summary of the results therein. 
A. The Process oj Appointing Independent Counsel Jor Children 
1. Summary 
The overwhelming majority of judges surveyed employ ap-
pointed counsel for children at some time, although not in every 
case. In deciding whether to appoint counsel, judges consider a 
range of factors, both substantive and procedural. 
Judges use care in selecting the counsel they appoint, often at-
tempting to match certain characteristics of counsel with the unique 
aspects of the case. Most judges are "very familiar" with the counsel 
125. Three judges have returned questionnaires too recently to be included in this 
Article. Thus, the total number of completed surveys is currently 49. 
126. The survey responses are on file with the Author. 
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they appoint. This may indicate that most judges have certain attor-
neys who have earned their confidence, and that the judges appoint 
only these attorneys. This conclusion is borne out by the answers to 
question 5A. Judges prefer to appoint counsel with whom they are 
familiar, and few will appoint counsel with whom they are not at all 
familiar. 
2. Results of Individual Questions 
Almost all judges appoint counsel for children at some point. 
When judges decide to appoint counsel, they do so most often after 
original motions and before final disposition. Within this range, the 
precise stage at which appointments are made varies: after original 
motions (24/46, 52%); during or after discovery (20/46, 43%); at 
some later stage in the trial proceeding (22/46, 48%). Most judges 
have appointed counsel at varying stages of the proceedings (26/46, 
57%), although a significant number (19/46, 41 %) seem to appoint 
at a certain set stage of the proceedings. 
The following factors most strongly indicate the need for inde-
pendent counsel for children: (1) the possibility of receiving inade-
quate information without independent counsel (42/47, 89%); (2) a 
high level of conflict between parents (41/47, 87%); (3) the poten-
tial for long-term damage to the child (35/47, 74%); (4) age of the 
child (27/47 57%); and (5) a high level of conflict between attor-
neys (23/47 49%). 
The following factor less strongly indicates the need for inde-
pendent counsel for children: the amount of money at issue (6/47, 
13%). Six judges felt strongly enough to write in the following fac-
tor: allegations of substance abuse or sexual abuse (6/47, 13%). 
Other factors considered include the maturity of the child and a 
high level of conflict between parent and child. 
All judges indicated that they considered a number of factors 
in reaching this decision; thus, no one factor is dispositive. The 
most common combinations of responses were: (1) risk of inade-
quate information and age of child (18/47, 38%); (2) parental con-
flict, attorney conflict, and the potential for harm to the child (14/ 
47 30%); and (3) parental conflict and potential for harm to the 
child (13/47 28%). 
The qualities most often sought in an attorney for appointed 
counsel are: (1) experience (35/44, 80%); (2) legal knowledge/ 
competence (34/44, 77%); and (3) the personal characteristics of 
counsel (27/44, 61 %). Almost all judges consider a number of fac-
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tors in reaching this decision, usually including some combination 
of the above three factors. 
Most judges appoint counsel with whom they are "very famil-
iar" (40/45, 89%). None will appoint counsel with whom they are 
"not at all familiar." Few judges will appoint counsel with whom 
they are "somewhat familiar" (19/45, 42%). Every judge prefers to 
appoint counsel with whom they are familiar. 
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APPENDIX B 
ABRIDGED SURVEY RESPONSES AND TABLES 
Question One: 
At what point in divorce or custody proceedings do you appoint . 
counsel for children? (Check one or more) 
Table I 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Never 1 2% 
Mter original motions 24 52% 
During or after discovery 20 43% 
At some later stage in the trial 22 48% 
proceeding 
Mter a final decision 2 4% 
Other 7 15% 
No response I NA 
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QJlestion TwcrA (Substantive): 
What factors indicate the need for independent counsel for chil-
dren? (Check one or more) 
Table 2A 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Possibility of receiving 42 89% 
inadequate information without 
independent counsel 
Age of child 27 57% 
Amount of money at issue 6 13% 
Other 13 28% 
No response 0 NA 
Qy,estion TwcrB (Procedural): 
What factors indicate the need for independent counsel for chil-
dren? (Check one or more) 
Table 2B 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
High level of conflict between 41 87% 
the parents 
High level of conflict between 23 49% 
attorneys 
Potential for long-term damage 35 74% 
to child from divorce proceeding 
Other 6 13% 
No response 0 NA 
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Question Three: 
What qualities do you look for in an attorney for appointed coun-
sel? (Check one or more) 
Table 3 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Experience 35 80% 
Legal knowledge/competence 34 77% 
Other knowledge/competence 18 41% 
(e.g., psychological) 
Personal characteristics (specify) 27 61% 
Other 4 9% 
No response 3 NA 
Question Four: 
How familiar are you with the attorneys you appoint? (Check one, 
or more if this varies) 
Table 4 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Very familiar 40 89% 
... 
Somewhat familiar 19 42% 
Not at all familiar 0 0% 
No response 2 NA 
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Question Five-A: 
Do you prefer to appoint counsel with whom you are familiar? 
Table 5A 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Yes 45 100% 
No 0 0% 
No response 2 NA 
Question Five-B: 
Will you appoint counsel with whom you are not at all familiar? 
Table 5B 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Yes 15 33% 
No 30 67% 
No response 2 NA 
Question Six: 
What is the present role of appointed counsel m your court? 
(Check one or more) 
Table 6 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Neutral fact-finder 26 58% 
Representative of the court 18 40% 
Representative of the child 43 96% 
Other (specify) 3 7% 
No response 2 NA 
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Question Seven: 
How should appointed counsel advocate for her client, the child? 
(Check one or more; also note whether any of these are entirely 
inappropriate) 
Table 7 
Response Number of Percentage" of 
Respondents Respondents 
Advocate child's best interests, 23 51% 
even if they conflict with (appropriate) 
child's stated wishes 0 0% 
(inappropriate) 
Advocate child's wishes, 9 20% 
regardless of attorney's views (appropriate) 
on child's best interests 5 11% 
(inappropriate) 
Make child's wishes clear, but 39 87% 
advocate for the child's best (appropriate) 
interests 0 0% 
(inappropriate) 
Advocacy varies 9 20% 
(appropriate) 
0 0% 
(inappropriate) 
No response 2 NA 
"." 
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Qy,estion Eight: 
How heavily should appointed counsel rely on psychiatric or other 
independent evaluations? (Check one or more; if other than psychi-
atric, please specify) 
Table 8 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Not at all 1 2% 
Very little 2 4% 
Somewhat 30 67% 
A great deal 8 18% 
This varies 6 13% 
No response 2 NA 
Qy,estion Nine: 
How much contact should appointed counsel have with the parents' 
attorneys? 
(Check one or more) 
Table 9 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
No contact 0 0% 
Minimal contact 14 30% 
Some additional outside contact 9 20% 
Close contact throughout the 13 28% 
entire proceeding 
Amount ,of contact varies 22 48% 
No response 1 NA 
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Question Ten: 
Are ex parte communications between the court and appointed 
counsel permissible? 
Table 10 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Yes 3 7% 
No 43 93% 
Allowed under exceptional 21 46% 
circumstances 
No response 1 NA 
Question Eleven: 
When should appointed counsel terminate his relationship with his 
client, the child? (Check one or more) 
Table 11 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Before settlement 0 0% 
Immediately after settlement 7 16% 
Sometime after settlement 7 16% 
This varies 33 75% 
No response 3 NA 
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Qy,estion Twelve: 
How do you view the quality of representation presently afforded by 
appointed counsel? (Check one or more) 
Table 12 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Excellent 23 50% 
Good 20 43% 
Adequate 5 11% 
Poor 1 2% 
Variable 1 2% 
No response 1 NA 
Qy,estion Thirteen: 
How have appointed counsel for children affected proceedings you 
have been involved in? (Check one or more) 
Table 13 
Response Number of Percentage of 
Respondents Respondents 
Beneficially 39 85% 
Detrimen tally 0 0% 
Varyingly 8 17% 
No response 2 NA 
